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Abstract: In the Information Age, the information overload transfers the burden of information 
business from obtaining data and information to its selection and processing, in the effort to produce 
studies or intelligence useful for international relations management. The criterion for selecting 
information is its relevance for a specific analytical task. By information relevance one can 
understand the degree of association between certain information and the issue of interest, or the 
measure that information matches the requirements for clearing the analytical problem. How can this 
be established? Of course, not directly, because there is no map of connections within information, 
although a key-word list or an index of terms might be available. 
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1. Congnitive Constructions Meant to Simplify Reality 
The dynamics of contemporary international relations raises apparently unpassable 
hurdles even for understanding the security environment, as well as for assessing 
developments, for forecast and future studies. Therefore, the classic analyst job, 
approximating the truth, becomes ever more difficult and demands cognitive tricks, 
albeit either unconscious, instinctive, or deliberately assumed. 
In the Information Age, the information overload transfers the burden of 
information business from obtaining data and information to its selection and 
processing, in the effort to produce studies or intelligence useful for international 
relations management. The criterion for selecting information is its relevance for a 
specific analytical task. By information relevance one can understand the degree of 
association between certain information and the issue of interest, or the measure 
                                                     
1 Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd., Galati 
800654, Romania, Tel.: +40372361102, Corresponding author: mirceamocanu@univ-danubius.ro.  
AUDRI, Vol. 12, no 1/2019, pp. 75-82 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol. 12, no. 1/2019 
   76 
that information matches the requirements for clearing the analytical problem. How 
can this be established? Of course, not directly, because there is no map of 
connections within information, although a key-word list or an index of terms 
might be available. The analyst must identify all possible significations of a certain 
event, of a new detail, or even the significations of non-action. Squeezing the 
information of all possible significance is a first-hand duty  fro the analyst, who 
ought to constantly ask himself questions regarding incoming information and the 
unknown reality. 
But this selection by information relevance is inherently accompanied by the 
reverse process of deselecting, that is the action of shedding certain information 
from the analytical process regarding a given issue. By deselecting, information 
assessed to have no or little connection to the issue is extracted from the process, 
for being irrelevant for that specific analytical task. Considering the complexity of 
security realities, the analyst needs a simplified version of the unknown, forged “by 
a set of biological, social [and psychological], at individual level. These filters have 
the role of transforming reality in digestible segments, which can be processed by 
human mind” (Marius Antonio Rebegea, 2013, p. 277). Adapting the reality 
representation by these filters is done “through three mechanisms of shaping 
human experience: generalization, omission, and distortion” (Marius Antonio 
Rebegea, 2013, p. 277). In complexity circumstances of contemporary environment 
in general, not only in security, the function of thinking is “mainly, eliminatory, not 
productive” (Aldous Huxley, 1954, p. 270). Therefore, the analyst uses these tools, 
omission among them, for simplifying reality, i.e. ignoring information deemed 
irrelevant for the analytical task. 
It is interesting that humans perform this selection / deselecting process both 
consciously, during the mental process of analysis, and unconsciously, when 
”navigating” across the sorrounding ocean of information. From an analytical point 
of view, this procedure of selection continues after the first contact with incoming 
information, during the phase when the observer / analyst turns to understanding 
reality, and organizing the cognitive domain associated to the analytical problem.  
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2. Analytical Absorbtion of Information 
The analysts perform what is called ”active reading” the text, not the general reader 
perusal. As a specialized reading procedure, the active reading principles 
recommend the following actions: (Irena Dumitru, 2013, p. 270):  
- Identification of “closed” points of view in information, i.e. “What did he mean”? 
, “So what?”; 
- Reconstruction of information from other source perspective – “How would Mr. 
Brown tell this story?”; 
- Primary evaluation of incoming read information based on quality, accuracy, 
relevance, deepness, breadth, and significance; 
- Identification of contradictions in the way the event is reproduced – “What does 
not fit?”, “What does not hold water?”; 
- Identification of possible “hidden agendas” and interests hiding behind the story – 
from this analytical requirement stems the conspiracy theory syndrom, which, 
many times, tempts the analyst. Professionalism presses the analyst to seek these 
aspects, but, in the same time, prevents him from seeing conspiracy behind any 
statement he reads; 
- Identification of hidden facts and cut-off information – “What is missing from the 
suspect’s pocket?” or “Why did the dog not bark?”; 
- Identification of points of view which are systematically presented either in favor 
or against certain course of action or subject.  
It surely seems complicated and one can ask whether the analyst can actually finish 
his work once he is done reading. Well, it is not like that. Indeed, analysts read 
with more attention and apply these recommendations, but the moments this 
happens during usual reading are not that often. On the other hand, experienced 
analysts, who are knowledgeable on the issue, almost only read the text which 
point to such analytical scrutiny, and the relevant elements pop up without having 
the due questions raised. The skill is there an dis watching.  
However, based on these recomendations, a structure of active reading has been 
established (Irena Dumitru, 2013, pp. 272 – 276) in seven subsequent steps: 
- Previsioning– a general look on the text, before reading, perusal of introductory 
messages and subtitles; 
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- Contextualization– placing the document in a broader framework; 
- Raising questions to which the paragraphs or ideas respond; 
- Assessment of own answers– identification of own biases and assumptions which 
can afflict understanding of the document; 
- Identification of main ideas, drafing a summary. “The result obtained by 
rephrasing... and in a shortened form reflects the way active reading can help 
understanding the text” (Irena Dumitru, 2013, pp. 275); 
- Argument evaluation, i.e. weighing the “attempts to demonstrate a statement, 
called conclusion, based on the veridicity of other statements, called premises” 
(Irena Dumitru, 2013, pp. 275); 
- Comparing the information for identifying either convergence points or split 
points with other information already known or attributed to other sources, aiming 
to judge the veridicity of that information (Irena Dumitru, 2013, pp. 275). 
 
3. Inferences and Assumptions in Intelligence Analysis 
This manner of absorbing an informational text leads to the next phase of analysis, 
which sends the analyst, from a cognitive point of view, into the unknown territory 
of judging the reality hiding behind available data and information. Intelligence 
analysis is a charting job, and the analyst... is a cartographer. Security 
information..., as a finished product of the process of analyzing primary data and 
information, is nothing else than a chart (re)presenting a certain territory, albeit real 
or potential (Marius Antonio Rebegea, 2013, p. 277). Exploring the unknown takes 
place either for realities placed in the past, in the case of explaining already 
completed events; in the present, for quickly understanding current developments; 
or for future events, in the case of assessments, prognoses, and forecast regarding 
future realities. 
A first step in charting is conducted through short forrays into a possible universe, 
that is through inferences, which answer to the need “for providing meaning, 
finding significations, attributing goals and causes” (Irena Dumitru, p. 279), and by 
which the analyst” interprets specific actions as being examples of behavior 
patterns, of intentions or feelings” (Irena Dumitru, p. 279). Thus, inference is a 
“mental process by which a general conclusion is extracted from several particular 
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facts”, they are “educated presumptions, based on facts” (Irena Dumitru, p. 279) 
that extend the logic towards statements regarding unknown areas of reality. 
The same family with presumptions is shared by assumptions, which are cognitive 
constructions which can be either sub-conscious, instinctive, or deliberate, forged 
by the analyst aiming to chart the unknown. As Bernard Shaw put it, nature cannot 
admit emptyness, and where humans do not know the truth, they fill the void with 
assumptions. More precisely, the analyst builds components by which he provides 
structure and he limits the unknown reality in the sense required by the analytical 
task. The analyst needs these additional components as suppositions suplementing 
the absence of facts necessary for understanding the reality or necessary for 
planning. Therefore, assumptions work as bridges over knowledge gaps, brifges 
which allow the analyst to navigate towards waters of more interest for the 
analytical task1. But the components added to known facts, the bridged unknown 
waters, are estimated to be steady, constant, or showing an irrelevant evolution, 
therefore neutral from the point of view of the analytical purpose. Assumptions can 
be explicit, mentioned as such in the part presenting the preconditions, the 
analytical bases, or they can remain tacit, implicit, although the analyst is aware of 
them. 
Philosophically, assumptions can be associated to the a priori knowledge that Kant 
introduced, which is located beyond empiric knowledge that, anyway, “never 
provide true or strict universality to their judgements, but only a supposed and 
relative universality, by induction” (Immanuel Kant, 2009, p. 52). Even before 
judgements offered by concrete experience, “a judgement thought in the same time 
with its need is firstly found, this is an a priori judgement” (Immanuel Kant, 2009, 
p. 52). This construction before the concrete experience is not infallible, it is even 
the source of many analysis errors. However, it is worth mentioning that 
assumptions belong to creative thinking, and they speak to all syntetic principles of 
pure intellect: axiomas of intuition, anticipations of perceptions, analogies of 
experience, and postulates of empiric thinking, in general (.Immanuel Kant, 2009, 
pp. 185 – 238).  
In practice, the object and extent of assumptions are very important, meaning what 
precisely is considered stable or with irrelevant dynamic for the upcoming analysis 
task. At the begining, assumptions are perhaps more important than the elements 
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considered relevant, because the latter would be subjected to later processing 
anyway. But the omitted components and constructions would not be further 
scrutinized, therefore sometimes causing analysis errors if neglected or sloppily 
introduced. 
Thus, the price of assumptions is dearly paid with intelligence failures or, in 
general, with wrong advice provided to decision-makers. In addition, in case of 
hostile intentions of aggressive actors on the international security stage, own 
assumptions can be used by the adversry with hostility, for producing surprise.  
In the contemporary security environment, complexity aggravates the danger cast 
by assumptions, because the need to use assumptions is now much bigger, and their 
foundation is much weaker. 
Regarding constraints considered as limitations of the actors’ movement, the 
following comparisons and differences can be considered: 
 Either subconscious or deliberate, assumptions pertain to the Actor operating with them; 
 Constraints are limitations imposed from outside the Actor, by the effect of interactions 
of other Actors, or by the effect of objective environment factors (space, time, geographic 
or other constraints). 
 
4. Assumptions in Decision-Making 
It is worth adding that assumptions are used not only in analysis, but also later, in 
planning. They even make a critical part of decision-making and decision 
implementation. Decision in a complex environment is largely based on intuition, 
which represents a better use of the human brain creative potential. This 
contribution is crucial in complex situations, which overcome usual possibilities of 
applying mathematics and automatization in decision-making. Here, assumptions 
consolidate scenarios and provide confidence to those using them, albeit analysts or 
decision-makers. 
In military, operational planning requests designing a decision support matrix, 
where explicit assumptions are stated1. Sometimes, these assumptions need to be 
consolidated, streamlined or even cleared up, and the planners draft critical 
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information requirements meant to enlarge the known part of reality, to diminish 
the unknown areas, and therefore to strengthen the confidence in sound decisions. 
 
5. Solutions for Controlling Assumptions 
Obviously, a first responsibility pertaining to the analyst is to become aware of the 
assumptions, to identify and define the assumptions generated and instrumented by 
the analyst subconscious. This is important because the mental process includes 
assumptions about which the analyst is not automatically aware, there are 
exclusions of areas in the sorrounding reality caused by their substitution with 
analyst own cognitive constructions. This way, inside the analyst creative thinking 
chemestry, the unconscious assumptions, those operating on conclusions in 
absence of analyst awareness, need to be identified and processed to become 
conscious assumptions. 
This goals can be achieved by identifying and defining the assumptions and biases 
beforehand, by describing the elements the analyst is considering in the framework 
of his analytic mechanism. 
Also, the analyst must identify the factors generating, and favoring or cancelling 
assumptions. This enterprise is supported by creativity and curiosity, qualities 
defining the analyst necessary general attitude and conduct. 
Treating assumptions is necessary, for example during the procedure of comparing 
competing hypotheses (ACH - Analysis of Competing Hypotheses). This operation 
should be performed by applying the requirement that considered hypotheses must 
be collectively exhausting, that is that considered hypotheses should exhaust, on the 
aggregate, absolutely all possible courses of action needed to be examined by the 
analyst. These working scenarios must be tested deeper, and monitored by using 
analytical indicators. 
Bottom line, analysts must explore all courses of action, including those unpopular 
(where the analyst courage comes to play), or the unlikely scenarios – so called 
«black swans». In this later case, the analyst must identify and track the factors 
which can transfer the black swans towards higher probability scenarios. 
Regarding delibetate assumptions, their usefulness is obvious considering the 
construction of courses of action by the analyst. For these scenarios, the analyst 
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builds analytical indicators which are included into the intelligence collection plans 
for detecting anomalies and producing warning.  
To conclude, assumptions have a crucial role for accurate analyses. Processing 
subconscious assumptions to deliberate assumptions, then checking the deliberate 
assumptions is very important reduce or to avoid analysis errors and intelligence 
failures. In complex security environment, assumption processing is a prerequisite 
for professional analysis. 
  
